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Abstract
In Hotelling type models consumers have the same transportation cost
function. We deviate from this assumption and introduce two con-
sumer types. Some consumers have linear transportation costs, while
the others have quadratic transportation costs. If at most half the
consumers have linear transportation costs, a subgame perfect equi-
librium in pure strategies exists for all symmetric locations. Further-
more, no general principle of differentiation holds. With two consumer
types, the equilibrium pattern ranges from maximum to intermediate
differentiation. The degree of product differentiation depends on the
fraction of consumer types.
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1 Introduction
Product differentiation is a major marketing tool. Firms use product differ-
entiation to soften price competition. In his seminal paper, Hotelling (1929)
introduced a very appealing model of horizontal product differentiation to cir-
cumvent the discontinuous consumer behavior proposed by Bertrand. The
Hotelling approach models product differentiation by introducing firm lo-
cations and consumer addresses. Consumers have different addresses. An
address represents a consumer’s ideal good or most preferred sales location.
The distance between a firm’s location and a consumer’s address indicates
how close the good actually produced is to the consumers’ ideal good. Con-
sumers who buy a less-than-ideal good incur a disutility; or, in Hotelling’s
term, transportation costs.
The literature views Hotelling’s original model as a two-stage location-
then-price game. Two firms compete for demand with a location choice
in the first stage, and with prices in the second. However, the two-stage
location-then-price game has a drawback. D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and
Thisse (1979) show that no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
exists if transportation costs are linear in distance. This non-existence occurs
because demand functions are discontinuous and hence profit functions are
neither continuous nor quasi-concave.
Existence of equilibrium in Hotelling type models depends on the basic
assumptions and a number of parameters. Brenner (2001) provides a nice
survey about the determinants of equilibrium existence and product differ-
entiation. For example, various authors consider firms locating on a circum-
ference, different number of firms, restricted reservation prices, non-uniform
consumer densities over space, collusive behavior, or choice of the pricing pol-
icy. The most influential modification comes from d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz,
1
and Thisse: quadratic transportation costs. With quadratic transportation
costs an equilibrium in pure strategies exists for any of the firms’ locations.
We make a related modification. Our modification consists in introduc-
ing two types of consumers. Besides varying tastes, consumers differ in the
assessment of the distance between ideal and actual good. For assessment of
distance we use linear and quadratic transportation cost functions, as these
types are well known and widely used in literature. Some consumers have
linear transportation costs. The other consumers have quadratic transporta-
tion costs. This specification represents a hybrid between Hotelling’s original
formulation and the modification of d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse.
Let us motivate different consumer types using Hotelling’s cider example.
We can view the firms’ locations as the degree of sourness in the cider they
offer. Consumers differ in the degree of sourness they desire. Now, consider
consumers who prefer the most sour cider possible. All these consumers
have the same address. If they consume the sweetest cider possible the
distance between their preferred and their consumed good is the same. But
it is possible that these consumers do not attach the same importance to
the distance. Consumers value the distance between ideal and consumed
good differently. Or, consider consumers whose ideal polo shirt brand is
Lacoste. If these consumers wear a polo shirt from Quicksilver, say, they
incur a disutility. Although the difference between Lacoste and Quicksilver
is fix, the disutility may vary among consumers. The disutility varies because
consumers assess the difference differently.
With our modification we remain very close to Hotelling’s model. But
we find pure strategy equilibrium existence for any symmetric locations if at
most half the consumers have a disutility linear in distance. By contrast, the
same existence problem as in Hotelling’s original model arises if more than
2
half the consumers have linear transportation costs. No equilibrium in pure
strategies exists for all symmetric locations.
Previous studies with modifications of Hotelling’s model reject a general
principle of differentiation1. We also reject a general principle of differentia-
tion. With two consumer types, differentiation between firms’ goods depends
on the fraction of the respective types. However, maximum differentiation is
frequent. Firms locate at the extremes in product space for fractions of con-
sumers with linear transportation costs between zero and one third. When
the fraction of consumers with linear transportation costs exceeds one third,
firms move towards each other. Equilibrium locations are interior solutions.
If the number of consumers with linear transportation costs is high (approx-
imately 0.86) the equilibrium distance between firms increases again. This
increase is due to restrictions for location spaces that we impose to solve the
non-existence problem. Firms must keep a minimal required distance. For
large fractions of consumers with linear transportation costs firms locate as
close to each other as the minimal required distance allows. The minimal re-
quired distance between firms is increasing in the fraction of consumers with
linear transportation costs. Hence, product differentiation also increases.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we set up Hotelling’s model
with two consumer types. Next, in section 3, we derive the demand func-
tions and the equilibrium. In section 4 we discuss the equilibrium outcome.
Finally, we conclude in section 5.
1See, e.g., Böckem (1994), Economides (1986), Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999),
and Wang and Yang (1999)
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2 The Model
Consider two firms, 1 and 2, each selling one good. The goods are identical
except for a one dimensional characteristic. This characteristic represents for
example the sweetness of cider or a firm’s brand. Firms choose the amount
of characteristic by locating on a line with length one. Each firm’s location
qi ∈ [0, 1] measures the amount of characteristic embodied in the good. We
assume that firm 1 locates to the left of firm 2, i.e., q1 < q2. Firm i sells
its good at mill price pi. Let us also assume, for simplicity, that both firms
produce at zero fixed and marginal costs.
Suppose there is a continuum of consumers with total mass one. All
consumers have the same gross valuation r for exactly one unit of the good.
The valuation r is sufficiently high such that in equilibrium all consumers
buy from one of the firms. So, valuation r is never binding and the market
always covered.
Each consumer knows her individually preferred amount of characteris-
tic embodied in the good. Denote a consumer’s most preferred amount of
characteristic by the address θ. If a consumer buys a good with a different-
than-ideal characteristic, she suffers a disutility. This disutility is the distance
between q and θ weighted by the utility loss per unit distance t. Per unit
distance costs t measure consumers’ sensitivity to product differentiation.
Thus, a consumer with address θ pays the mill price p and transportation
costs t|q−θ| when buying a good with characteristic q. We call the mill price
plus the transportation costs the generalized price.
Up to this point we follow Hotelling’s original model. Our modification
consists in modelling two types of consumers. A fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of con-
sumers incur linear transportation costs. The other fraction (1 − α) of con-
sumers have quadratic transportation costs. We denote a consumer’s address
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who has linear transportation costs by θl. Similarly, we denote a consumer’s
address who has convex transportation costs by θc. Addresses for consumers
with linear transportation costs are uniformly distributed on [0, 1] with den-
sity α. Analogously, addresses for consumers with quadratic transportation
costs are uniformly distributed on the unit interval with density (1− α).
A consumer with linear transportation costs and address θl who buys a
good with characteristic q at price p has utility
ul(θl, q, p) = r − t|q − θl| − p.
A consumer with convex transportation costs and address θc who buys a
good with characteristic q at price p has utility
uc(θc, q, p) = r − t(q − θc)2 − p.
We study a two-stage price-then-location game. In the first stage firms
simultaneously choose locations bearing in mind the subsequent price equi-
librium. Given their locations, firms simultaneously set prices in the second
stage. To solve the game we use the solution concept of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium. For both stages we look for equilibria in pure strategies.
3 The Equilibrium
3.1 Demand Specification
For the sake of clarity we derive the demand functions before we determine
firms’ equilibrium behavior. Each consumer buys from the firm which offers
her the least generalized price. First, consider consumers with linear trans-
portation costs. Given firms’ locations and their prices all consumers with
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address that satisfies
−t(θl − q1)− p1 ≥ −t(q2 − θl)− p2
buy firm 1’s good. The consumer who is indifferent between buying firm 1’s
and firm 2’s good has address θ̂l = [t(q1 + q2) + p2 − p1] /(2t). Consumers
with address θl ≤ θ̂l buy from firm 1.
Now, consider consumers with convex transportation costs. All con-
sumers with address such that
−t(q1 − θc)2 − p1 ≥ −t(q2 − θc)2 − p2
prefer to buy firm 1’s good. Therefore, the indifferent consumer has address
θ̂c = [t(q
2
2 − q21) + p2 − p1] /(2t(q2 − q1)). All consumers with address θc ≤ θ̂c
shop at firm 1.
Implicitly, we assume that θ̂l and θ̂c lie between q1 and q2. It turns out
that this is implied by existence of pure strategy equilibria in the price game.
Using the distributional assumptions for the addresses firm 1 faces the
demand function
D1 = Prob[θl ≤ θ̂l] + Prob[θc ≤ θ̂c]
= αθ̂l + (1− α)θ̂c.
Similarly, the demand function for firm 2’s good is
D2 = α(1− θ̂l) + (1− α)(1− θ̂c).
3.2 The Firms’ Equilibrium Behavior
To find the subgame perfect equilibrium we solve the location-then-price
game by backwards induction. In the second stage we look for a Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium in prices. That is, firm i takes locations and pj as given and
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chooses pi to maximize profits πi = piDi. The firms maximization problems
are
max
p1
π1 = max
p1
p1 [α(t(q1 + q2) + p2 − p1)
+(1− α)(t(q22 − q21) + p2 − p1)/(q2 − q1)
]
/(2t),
max
p2
π2 = max
p2
p2 [α(2t− t(q1 + q2)− p2 + p1)
+(1− α)(2t(q2 − q1)− t(q22 − q21)− p2 + p1)/(q2 − q1)
]
/(2t).
The F.O.Cs. for the firms’ maximization problems yield their price reaction
functions:
p1(p2) =p2/2 + t(q
2
2 − q21)/ (2(1− α(1− q2 + q1))) ,
p2(p1) =p1/2 + t(2(q2 − q1) + q21 − q22)/(2(1− α(1− q2 + q1))).
Note that ∂2πi/∂p
2
i < 0 for all α by the assumption q1 < q2. Both profit
functions are strictly concave in prices and the second order conditions are
satisfied. It follows that the F.O.Cs. yield the optimal price reaction func-
tions.
The reaction functions are linearly increasing functions of the other firm’s
price. Therefore, we can solve the system of equations given by the reaction
functions to calculate the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices. The firms’ equi-
librium prices in the second stage, given their locations, are
p∗1(q1, q2) = t(2 + q1 + q2)(q2 − q1)/(3(1− α(1− q2 + q1))),
p∗2(q1, q2) = t(4− q1 − q2)(q2 − q1)/(3(1− α(1− q2 + q1))).
So far we neglected the possibility that firms can sell to consumers in the
other firm’s hinterland. In Hotelling’s original model a firm can lower its
price and attract the consumers in the rival’s back yard too. D’Aspremont,
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Gabszewicz, and Thisse show that the firms start undercutting each other’s
price if they are located too closely. This undercutting process does not con-
verge to an equilibrium in pure strategies. For Hotelling’s model with convex
transportation costs d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse show that no un-
dercutting process occurs. These findings suggest that in our model a process
of price cuts also occurs for consumers with linear transportation costs. Firm
i can lower its price so that it sells to all consumers with linear transportation
costs. However, the findings also suggest that the firms do not undercut each
other to attract additional consumers with convex transportation costs.
Indeed, an undercutting process does not occur with respect to consumers
with convex transportation costs (see Appendix A). But it can be profitable
for the firms to serve all consumers with linear transportation costs. In
this case firm i lowers its price so that the consumer located at the same
point where firm j is located purchases from firm i. Thus, firm i serves
the entire market share α. For a given p∗j(q1, q2) firm i undercuts with the
highest possible price pi such that it just serves all consumers with linear
transportation costs (see Appendix A).
If firm 1 undercuts with the price p1, given p
∗
2(q1, q2), the indifferent con-
sumer has address θ̂1c = (q
2
2 − q21 + (p∗2(q1, q2) − p1)/t)/(2(q2 − q1)). Simi-
larly for firm 2. Given p∗1(q1, q2) and close locations, firm 2 undercuts with
the price p2. The indifferent consumer has address θ̂
2
c = (q
2
2 − q21 + (p2 −
p∗1(q1, q2))/t)/(2(q2 − q1)).
The firms undercut each other if p∗1(q1, q2) and p
∗
2(q1, q2) are not globally
profit-maximizing. Then, the same problem as in Hotelling’s original model
arises. For p∗1(q1, q2) and p
∗
2(q1, q2) to constitute Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
prices, the firms must not undercut. Following d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz
8
and Thisse, the firms do not undercut each other if
p∗1(q1, q2)D1 ≥ (p∗2(q1, q2)− t(q2 − q1))(α + (1− α)θ̂1c ), (1)
p∗2(q1, q2)D2 ≥ (p∗1(q1, q2)− t(q2 − q1))(α + (1− α)(1− θ̂2c )), (2)
with the demand for good 1 and good 2
D1 = (2 + q1 + q2)/6, D2 = (4− q1 − q2)/6,
and the indifferent consumers
θ̂1c = (q1 + q2 + 1)/2, θ̂
2
c = (q1 + q2 − 1)/2.
Note that θ̂1c and θ̂
2
c are the indifferent consumers’ addresses for pi = p
∗
j(q1, q2)−
t(q2 − q1).
At this point we focus on symmetric locations. Hence, q1 + q2 = 1. It
follows that the indifferent consumers with quadratic transportation costs
are θ̂1c = 1 and θ̂
2
c = 0. This means, the undercutting firm serves the entire
market by charging pi. At the undercutting price pi and with symmetric
locations both conditions (1) and (2) simplify to:
1/2 ≥ (3α + 3αq1 − 3αq2)/3.
For an equilibrium to exist, the distance between the firms must satisfy
q2−q1 ≥ d(α) = (2α−1)/(2α). We call d(α) the minimum required distance.
It is important to discuss the minimum required distance d(α) = (2α −
1)/(2α) in more detail. We discuss the minimum required distance for interior
locations because d(α) is at most 1/2, e.g., d = 1/2 if α = 1. For α ≤ 1/2
the required distance is never greater than zero. Consequently, firms never
find undercutting profitable. Let us give an intuition why undercutting is
not profitable for α ≤ 1/2. With symmetric locations firms’ prices are the
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same, i.e., p∗1(q1, q2) = p
∗
2(q1, q2). To gain the entire market, firm i reduces
its price by t(q2 − q1). But the higher demand comes at the expense of a
price reduction t(q2 − q1) for consumers that already buy from firm i. This
expense is high if the price reduction is high relative to the price p∗i (q1, q2).
The price is increasing in α as ∂p∗i (q1, q2)/∂α > 0 shows. Hence, the smaller
α, the higher is the price reduction compared to p∗i (q1, q2). For α ≤ 1/2
a gain in market share does not compensate for the loss due to a lower
price. The price reduction t(q2 − q1) is too large relative to firm i’s price
to make undercutting profitable. However, with an increasing α the price
reduction becomes smaller relative to p∗i (q1, q2). Undercutting becomes more
attractive. For an equilibrium to exist the firms must be further away from
each other. For α > 1/2 the minimum required distance is positive. The
minimum required distance d(α) is an increasing function of α. Hence, the
higher α, the greater must be d. The polar case α = 1 is Hotelling’s original
model and the firms must be located outside the quartiles for an equilibrium
in pure strategies.
We state the findings from the discussion of the minimum required dis-
tance in Lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 In Hotelling’s location-then-price game with two types of con-
sumers and q1 + q2 = 1 a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium always
exists for α ≤ 1/2. The price equilibrium is given by p∗1(q1, q2) and p∗2(q1, q2).
Lemma 2 In Hotelling’s location-then-price game with two types of con-
sumers and q1+q2 = 1 a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium for α > 1/2
exists iff q2 − q1 ≥ d(α). If a price equilibrium exists, it is given by p∗1(q1, q2)
and p∗2(q1, q2).
Lemma 2 has a crucial impact on equilibrium existence in the whole two-
10
stage location-then-price game. According to Lemma 2, no price equilibrium
in pure strategies exists for α > 1/2 and location combinations which violate
q2 − q1 ≥ d(α). For these location combinations firms cannot know their
payoffs because no price equilibrium exists. Without knowledge of their
payoffs, firms do not have the basis for a rational location decision. Therefore,
we must restrict firms’ location spaces in case α > 1/2.
The restriction of firms’ location spaces is symmetric around the center
because we focus on symmetric locations. A symmetric restriction means
that firms cannot locate closer to the center than half the minimum required
distance. Firm 1 to the left and firm 2 to the right of the center. For firm 1
the restricted strategy space is q1 ∈ [0, (1 − d(α))/2]. By symmetry, firm 2
chooses locations q2 ∈ [(1 + d(α))/2, 1].
We now turn to the first stage in the location-then-price game. In the first
stage, firms simultaneously choose their locations. Firm i maximizes profits
πi with respect to its location qi. Substituting the equilibrium prices p
∗
1 and p
∗
2
dependent on locations into the firms’ profit functions, firms’ maximization
problems are
max
q1
t(2 + q2 + q1)
2(q2 − q1)/(18(1− α(1− q2 + q1))),
max
q2
t(4− q1 − q2)2(q2 − q1)/(18(1− α(1− q2 + q1))).
Differentiating firms’ profits with respect to locations yields the following
F.O.Cs.:
∂π1
∂q1
=
t(2 + q1 + q2)
18(1− α + αq2 − αq1)2 [2α(q1 − q2)
2 + (1− α)(q2 − 3q1 − 2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A1
= 0,
∂π2
∂q2
=
t(4− q1 − q2)
18(1− α + αq2 − αq1)2
[
(1− α)(4 + q1 − 3q2)− 2α(q1 − q2)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A2
= 0.
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A closer look at the F.O.Cs. shows that the relevant terms for firms’
optimal locations are A1 for firm 1 and A2 for firm 2. Solving Ai = 0 for qi
yields firm i’s optimal location as reaction function qi(qj) of the other firm
j’s location. The equation Ai = 0 is quadratic in qi and yields two solutions
q1(q2) =
(
4αq2 + 3(1− α)±
√
16αq2(1− α) + 9− 2α− 7α2
)
/(4α),
q2(q1) =
(
4αq1 − 3(1− α)±
√
9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16αq1(1− α)
)
/(4α).
Easy algebra shows that the first solution for firm 1’s location reaction func-
tion implies q1(q2) ≥ q2. Similarly, the second solution for firm 2’s optimal
location yields q2(q1) ≤ q1. Hence, the economically meaningful reaction
function for firm 1 is the second solution and for firm 2 the first solution. To
keep track of, we restate the firms’ location reaction functions:
q1(q2) =
(
4αq2 + 3(1− α)−
√
16αq2(1− α) + 9− 2α− 7α2
)
/(4α),
q2(q1) =
(
4αq1 − 3(1− α) +
√
9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16αq1(1− α)
)
/(4α).
The intersection of the reaction functions gives a closed form solution for
an interior Nash equilibrium in locations (that is, one where 0 < q1 < q2 < 1).
To show the existence of an interior Nash equilibrium we need the reaction
curves behavior. A detailed discussion of the reaction curves is relegated to
Appendix B. Here, we report the reaction functions’ main characteristics
and depict them in Figure 1. Figure 1 displays all location combinations in
q1-q2-space. The line q1 = q2 separates the q1-q2-space into two regions. In
the region to the left of q1 = q2 lie all location combinations with q1 > q2.
The right region contains all combinations with q1 < q2. Therefore, the
reaction functions must lie in the region to the right of the line q1 = q2.
Firm 1’s reaction function is strictly convex. Firm 2’s reaction function is
strictly concave. Both reaction functions have slopes smaller than one. For
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q1+q2 < 1 firm 1’s reaction function has a smaller slope than firm 2’s reaction
function. If the firms’ locations are symmetric the reaction curves have the
same slope. For q1 + q2 > 1 firm 1’s reaction function is steeper than firm
2’s.
 
q2(q1) 
q1(q2) 
q1 
q2 
1 
1 
q1 = q2, 
slope = 1 
1= q1 + q2 
q1(1) 
q2(0) 
Figure 1: Intersection of the reaction functions for α > 1/3
The following, rather tedious arguments describe when the reaction func-
tions intersect. Consider the values q2(0) and q1(1). Firm 1’s reaction
function evaluated at q2(0) can be equal to, smaller, or greater than 0:
q1(q2(0)) S 0. Analogously, firm 2’s reaction function evaluated at q1(1)
can be equal to, smaller, or greater than 1: q2(q1(1)) S 1.
For α > 1/3 we have q1(q2(0)) > 0 and q2(q1(1)) < 1 as depicted in figure
1. From firm 1’s viewpoint its reaction function lies to the left of firm 2’s for
q2(0). By contrast, firm 1’s reaction function lies to the right of firm 2’s for
q1(1). Hence, for α > 1/3 the reaction functions intersect. An interior Nash
equilibrium in locations exists.
For α = 1/3 we obtain q1(1) = 0 and q2(0) = 1. The reaction functions
and the intersection coincide with the corner point identified by the location
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pair (q1 = 0, q2 = 1).
It remains to consider firms’ location choices for α < 1/3. In these cases,
we have q1(1) < 0 and q2(1) > 1: the reaction functions are not in the
strategy spaces, i.e., q1 /∈ [0, q2) and q2 /∈ (q1, 1]. Hence, no intersection
between the reaction functions exists.
We are now ready to determine the firms’ optimal location choices. For
α > 1/3 an interior Nash equilibrium in locations exists and is given by the
system of equations containing firms’ reaction functions. Solving the system
of equations for firm 1’s location yields two solutions:
q∗1 = (1 + α±
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(4α).
The solution q1 = (1 + α +
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(4α) is not in the strategy
space. In particular,
(1 + α +
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(4α) >



1, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2,
(1− d(α))/2, for 1/2 < α ≤ 1.
Therefore, we can exclude this first solution. Plugging q∗1 in firm 2’s reaction
function yields its optimal location:
q∗2 =
(
4α− 2−
√
(1− α)(5α + 1)
+
√
(1− α)(19α + 5 + 4
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))
)
/(4α)
=
(
4α− 2−√1− α
(√
5α + 1−
√
(
√
1− α + 2√5α + 1)2
))
/(4α)
=
(
4α− 2 +√1− α(√1− α +√5α + 1)
)
/(4α)
=
(
3α− 1 +
√
(1− α)(5α + 1)
)
/(4α).
For α = 1/3 the firms’ reaction functions coincide in the corner (0, 1).
Easy calculations show that firm 1 chooses q1 = 0 given q2 = 1. Firm 2’s
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optimal location is q2 = 1 given q1 = 0. Indeed, the location pair (q
∗
1 = 0, q
∗
2 =
1) is a Nash equilibrium in locations. Firms choose maximum differentiation.
Last, what is the firms’ optimal behavior if α < 1/3? We know that
A1 < 0 and A2 > 0 for α < 1/3. It follows that ∂π1/∂q1 < 0 for firm 1
and ∂π2/∂q2 > 0 for firm 2. Consequently, each firm increases its profits
by moving away as far as possible from the other. Thus, the principle of
maximum differentiation also holds for α < 1/3.
Figure 2 shows firms’ location choices by the solid lines. The shaded area  
q2
q1
α 
qi 
1/3 /2)/310(1+
Figure 2: Firms’ equilibrium locations
represents the restriction in location spaces. Firms choose symmetric interior
locations around the center for α > 1/3, i.e., q∗1 + q
∗
2 = 1. Furthermore, the
distance d∗ = (α − 1 +
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(2α) between firms’ equilibrium
locations is a decreasing function of α. With a higher α the firms increase
their profits by moving towards each other. But we restrict firms’ location
spaces for α > 1/2. Both firms must maintain half the minimum required
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distance d(α): q∗1 ≤ (1 − d(α))/2 and q∗2 ≥ (1 + d(α))/2. These conditions
boil down to
0 ≤ 6α2 − 4α− 1
for both firms. Obviously, the condition is satisfied for 1/3 < α < (1 +
√
10/2)/3. In this range, firms’ optimal locations are given by the solution
to the system of equations containing firms’ reaction functions. For α >
(1+
√
10/2)/3 firms move as close as possible to the center as strategy spaces
allow: q∗1 = (1 − d(α))/2 and q∗2 = (1 + d(α))/2. Because d is increasing
in α the restriction of location spaces forces firms further apart for α >
(1 +
√
10/2)/3.
We summarize the firms’ behavior in the location stage with Lemma 3:
Lemma 3 In Hotelling’s location-then-price game with two types of con-
sumers firms choose locations
q∗1 =



0, for α ≤ 1/3,
(1 + α−
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(4α), for 1/3 < α ≤ (1 +√10/2)/3,
1/(4α), for (1 +
√
10/2)/3 < α,
and
q∗2 =



1, for α ≤ 1/3,
(3α− 1 +
√
(1− α)(5α + 1))/(4α), for 1/3 < α ≤ (1 +√10/2)/3,
1− 1/(4α), for (1 +√10/2)/3 < α.
We may summarize our findings and describe the equilibrium in Propo-
sition 1.
Proposition 1 In the Hotelling two-stage location-then-price game with
fraction α of consumers with linear transportation costs and fraction 1 − α
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of consumers with quadratic transportation costs we find the following equi-
libria:
· if α ≤ 1/3 (i.e., α is small) firms choose locations q∗1 = 0 and q∗2 = 1.
Firms set the same price p∗1 = p
∗
2 = t and earn profits π
∗
1 = π
∗
2 = t/2,
· if 1/3 < α ≤ (1 + √10/2)/3 (i.e., α is intermediate) firms choose
locations given by Lemma 3. Firms set the same price p∗1 = p
∗
2 = p
∗ =
t(1−α−
√
(5α + 1)(1− α))/(α(α−1−
√
(5α + 1)(1− α))) and earn profits
π∗1 = π
∗
2 = p
∗/2,
· if (1+√10/2)/3 < α (i.e., α is large) firms choose locations q∗1 = 1/(4α)
and q∗2 = 1 − 1/(4α). Firms set the same price p∗1 = p∗2 = t(2α − 1)/α and
earn profits π∗1 = π
∗
2 = t(2α− 1)/(2α).
4 Discussion
We begin the discussion with the degree of price competition. Our specifica-
tion for the degree of price competition refers to the cross-price sensitivity of
demand. The cross-price sensitivity is the amount of consumers firm i gains
or loses as firm j changes its price2. In our model, the cross-price sensitivity
is equal to the own-price sensitivity multiplied by -1. Thus, our definition
for the degree of price competition η is:
η = ∂Di/∂pj = −∂Di/∂pi = (1− α(1− d)) /(2dt), i = 1, 2,
where d = q2 − q1. With this definition the measure for the degree of price
competition is on the positive real axis. A higher η indicates more intense
price competition. Note that the degree of price competition η does not
2Brenner (2001) uses the cross-price sensitivity of demand as a measure for the degree
of price competition to highlight the relationship between transportation cost functions
and equilibrium existence.
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account for undercutting effects. But we focus on pure strategy equilibria and
restrict location spaces. Undercutting is ruled out. Therefore, we proceed
the discussion about η without considering an undercutting process.
The degree of price competition η depends on parameters t and α as well
as on distance d. First, price competition intensifies if t decreases, ceteris
paribus. Firms’ prices are lower, the lower is t. This is characteristic for
Hotelling-type models, since t represents consumers’ sensitivity to product
differentiation. Consumers attach less importance to product differentiation
when t is low. When t approaches zero, the model approaches Bertrand
competition with homogeneous goods.
Secondly, the degree of price competition is decreasing in α, given t and
d: ∂η/∂α = −(1 − d)/(2dt) ≤ 0. Price competition becomes less intense,
the higher the fraction of consumers with linear transportation costs. When
deciding about buying good 1 or good 2, consumers compare the utility from
consuming good 1 with the utility from consuming good 2. This utility
comparison reduces to a comparison of the difference in transportation costs
with the price difference. Consumers with linear transportation costs (l-
consumers) buy good 1 if
t(q1 + q2 − 2θl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in
transportation costs
≥ p1 − p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
price
difference
.
Consumers with quadratic transportation costs (c-consumers) buy good 1 if
t(q1 + q2 − 2θc)(q2 − q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
difference in transportation costs
≥ p1 − p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
price
difference
.
Now, consider consumers with the same address but being of a different type,
i.e., θl = θc. For both consumer types the price difference is the same. By
contrast, the difference in transportation costs is greater for l-consumers than
18
for c-consumers:
q1 + q2 − 2θl > (q1 + q2 − 2θc)(q2 − q1),
1 > q2 − q1,
except when d = 1. If d = 1 the difference is the same for both consumer
types. Consumers with θl = θc perceive the price difference relative to the
difference in transportation costs equally. A price change, and hence a change
in the price difference, has the same effect on consumers’ buying decision,
independent of their type. However, the difference in transportation costs
is greater for l-consumers than for c-consumers if d < 1. Relative to trans-
portation costs, l-consumers care less for a price change than c-consumers.
A price change has a weaker effect on l-consumers. If α increases more con-
sumers care less for the price relative to travel distance. The degree of price
competition decreases.
We can confirm the observation ∂η/∂α < 0 by considering Hotelling’s
original model and the modified version of d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and
Thisse. These models are the two polar cases α = 1 and α = 0 in our
work. In Hotelling’s original model the degree of price competition is 1/(2t).
In the model of d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse the degree of price
competition is 1/(2dt). Because 1/(2dt) > 1/(2t) for d < 1, price competition
in the polar case α = 0 is more intense than in the opposite polar case
α = 1. With an increasing α we move from more to less intense competition.
The degree of price competition decreases. For d = 1 the degree of price
competition is the same in both polar cases. It is straightforward, then, that
the degree of price competition is independent of α: ∂η/∂α = 0.
The third factor that affects the degree of price competition is the distance
d = q2−q1. Keeping t and α constant, the degree of competition is decreasing
in d, i.e., ∂η/∂d = (−1 + α)/(2d2t) ≤ 0. By moving towards each other the
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firms offer less differentiated goods. For consumers, less differentiation leads
to better substitutability between goods. Price competition increases.
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium degree of price competition η∗ for
various t by solid lines. The dotted line is the equilibrium distance d∗ between
firms.
 
η*, d* 
α 
η*, t = 3/5 
d* 
η*, t = 4/5 
η*, t = 2 
1/3 /2)/310(1+
Figure 3: The degree of price competition for various t and the distance
between firms in equilibrium
In the range α ≤ 1/3 firms choose maximum differentiation. The de-
gree of price competition is constant. For 1/3 < α ≤ (1 + √10/2)/3 both
firms move towards the center. The distance d∗ and product differentia-
tion decrease. Because products are less differentiated price competition is
more intense. As soon as α > (1 +
√
10/2)/3 the degree of price compe-
tition decreases. Two effects that work in the same direction relax price
competition. With an increasing α we move closer to Hotelling’s original
model. As argued above the degree of price competition is lower the closer
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we are to Hotelling’s original model. The second effect stems from the re-
striction of location spaces. For α > (1 +
√
10/2)/3 firms move away from
each other because they must keep the minimum required distance d. Be-
cause ∂d(α)/∂α > 0 the distance between firms increases. Firms offer more
differentiated goods. More differentiated goods soften price competition.
Let us now discuss firms’ location choices in the second stage. Proposition
1 and Figure 2 show that no general principle of differentiation exists in our
model. Differentiation depends on the fraction of l- and c-consumers in the
way intuitively expected. The more consumers with linear transportation
costs, the closer we are to Hotelling’s model and the closer firms move to each
other. However, maximum differentiation is frequent for the range α ≤ 1/3.
It seems that maximum differentiation is quite robust.
Two now standard opposite effects are responsible for firms’ location
choices. On the one hand, firms differentiate their goods to weaken price
competition. This is the price effect. Because a larger distance between
firms reduces the degree of price competition firms want to move away from
each other. On the other hand, firms move inwards in the product space
to capture a larger market share. This centripetal force is the demand ef-
fect. The relative strength of those effects determines the location pattern
in equilibrium.
The price effect dominates the demand effect if the fraction of consumers
with linear transportation costs is small. In this case, the principle of maxi-
mum differentiation holds. By contrast, maximum differentiation is not the
equilibrium outcome for intermediate and large α. The reason is that the
demand effect does not depend on α while the price effect does. With an in-
creasing α the degree of price competition decreases. Relative to the demand
effect the price effect becomes weaker. The price effect does not overcompen-
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sate the demand effect anymore. Firms balance the trade-off between price
and demand effect increasingly in favor of the latter. Since the trade-off is
increasingly in favor of the demand effect, firms move towards each other for
intermediate α. For large α, the demand effect still becomes stronger. But
again, the restricted location spaces lead to increased product differentiation.
Last, we turn to the condition that ensures an equilibrium. More pre-
cisely, what is the maximum fraction of consumers with linear transportation
costs such that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists for all symmetric lo-
cations. The answer is short and given by Lemmas 1 and 2: α ≤ 1/2. At
most half the consumers can have linear transportation costs. Otherwise, no
pure-strategy price equilibrium exists in the second stage for all symmetric
locations. Without price equilibrium for some location patterns firms are not
able to evaluate their profits in the first stage. No (pure-strategy) equilibrium
to the two-stage location-then-price game exists.
As it is well-known, non-existence of equilibrium in Hotelling’s original
model arises because the profit functions are not quasi-concave. The same
problem occurs for α > 1/2 in our model. Profit functions are neither contin-
uous nor quasi-concave. Firms can undercut the opponent’s price to capture
the entire market. At this undercutting price the profit functions, as well as
the demand functions, are discontinuous. For α > 1/2 and sufficiently close
locations undercutting is profitable. Profit functions have an upward discon-
tinuity. In this case, firms’ profit functions are not quasi-concave. Firms start
undercutting each other. The undercutting process results in discontinuous
best reply functions. Unfortunately, these discontinuous best reply functions
do not lead to a price equilibrium in pure strategies.
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5 Conclusions
Consumers may assess deviations from buying a less-than-ideal good differ-
ently. To allow for such different assessment we introduce two consumer types
in Hotelling’s model of product differentiation. A fraction α of consumers
have linear transportation costs. The other fraction (1 − α) of consumers
have quadratic transportation costs.
As expected, we cannot support a general principle of differentiation. But
maximum differentiation seems to be quite robust. In the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium firms choose maximum differentiation if at most one third of
the consumers have linear transportation costs. With an increasing fraction
of consumers who have a disutility linear in distance the agglomeration force
becomes stronger. Firms move closer to each other.
The fraction of consumers with linear transportation costs also affects
equilibrium existence. A subgame perfect equilibrium does not exist for any
symmetric locations and any fraction of consumers with linear transportation
costs. Only if at most half the consumers have linear transportation costs
an equilibrium in the price subgame exists. A price equilibrium no longer
exists for any symmetric locations if more than half the consumers have
linear transportation costs. The same non-existence problem as in Hotelling’s
model occurs.
To circumvent the non-existence problem we impose location restrictions
on firms. Firms must keep the minimal required distance such that a pure-
strategy price equilibrium exists. This minimal required distance must go
from zero to one half.
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Appendix A
We now proof that the firms set an undercutting price pi = pj − t(q2 − q1)
given selling to all consumers with linear transportation costs is profitable.
To serve all consumers with linear transportation costs firm i can at most
charge the price pi. With a higher price the consumer located at the same
point where firm j is does not purchase from firm i. Because the consumer
with address θl = qj does not buy firm i’s good not all consumers with linear
transportation costs buy firm i’s good. Therefore, we can restrict attention
to prices pi ≤ pi.
Consider firm 1 that undercuts firm 2. If firm 1 sets a price p1 ≤ p1 it
sells to all consumers with linear transportation costs. At an undercutting
price p1 firm 1 bags profits
π1 = p1
(
α + (1− α)t(q
2
2 − q21) + p2 − p1
2t(q2 − q1)
)
.
Firm 1’s profits change with p1 according to
∂π1
∂p1
= α + (1− α)t(q
2
2 − q21) + p2 − 2p1
2t(q2 − q1) .
For p1 = p2 − t(q2 − q1) this derivative is
∂π1
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
p1=p1
= α + (1− α)t(q
2
2 − q21)− p2 + 2t(q2 − q1)
2t(q2 − q1) .
Now, for a given p2 = p
∗
2(q1, q2) the derivative ∂π1/∂p1 evaluated at p1 =
p∗2(q1, q2)− t(q2 − q1) is positive:
∂π1
∂p1
∣∣∣∣
p1=p1
S 0
2tα(q2 − q1) + (1− α)t(q22 − q21) S (1− α)(p∗2(q1, q2)− 2t(q2 − q1))
2 + (1− α)(q1 + q2) S (1− α)(4− q1 − q2)
3(1− α + αq2 − αq1)
6α(q2 − q1) + 3(1− α)(q1 + q2)(1− α + αq2 − αq1) > −(1− α)(2 + q1 + q2).
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Taking the second derivative of π1 with respect to p1 shows that firm 1’s
undercutting profits are a strictly concave function:
∂π21
∂2p1
= −1/(t(q2 − q1)).
Because firm 1’s profit function is concave the derivative ∂π1/∂p1 is positive
for all p1 ≤ p∗2(q1, q2)− t(q2− q1). Firm 1’s profits are an increasing function
of the price: the higher the price, the higher the profits. Thus, firm 1 chooses
the highest possible undercutting price p1 = p
∗
2(q1, q2)− t(q2 − q1), provided
that it is profitable to attract all consumers with linear transportation costs.
Going through the same calculations for firm 2 yields an analogous re-
sult. Given that serving all consumers with linear transportation costs is
profitable, firm 2 undercuts with a price p2 = p
∗
1(q1, q2)− t(q2 − q1).
Appendix B
Maximizing firms’ profits with respect to their locations yields the reaction
functions:
q1(q2) =
(
4αq2 + 3(1− α)−
√
16α(1− α)q2 + 9− 2α− 7α2
)
/(4α),
q2(q1) =
(
4αq1 − 3(1− α) +
√
9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16α(1− α)q1
)
/(4α).
Denote the term in the square root in firm i’s reaction function by ϕi. Simple
inspection of ϕi shows that it is non-negative. For ϕ1 in firm 1’s reaction
function this is
ϕ1 = 16α(1− α)q2 + 9− 2α− 7α2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
≥ 0, ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
To see that ϕ2 in firm 2’s reaction function is also non-negative we first
observe that it negatively depends on q1. Hence, if ϕ2 is non-negative for
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q1 = 1, non-negativity holds for all q1 ≤ 1. The problem boils down to
checking if ϕ2 is non-negative for q1 = 1. Indeed, for q1 = 1, ϕ2 is not smaller
than zero:
ϕ2 = 9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16α + 16α2 ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ [0, 1].
Both reaction functions are positively sloped:
∂q1(q2)
∂q2
=1− 2(1− α)√
16α(1− α)q2 + 9− 2α− 7α2
> 0,
∂q2(q1)
∂q1
=1− 2(1− α)√
9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16α(1− α)q1
> 0.
Moreover, the first derivatives show that the slopes are never greater than
one. Let us also compare these slopes:
∂q1(q2)/∂q2 S ∂q2(q1)/∂q1
1− 2(1− α)√
16α(1− α)q2 + 9− 2α− 7α2
S 1− 2(1− α)√
9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16α(1− α)q1
16α(1− α)q2 + 9− 2α− 7α2 S 9 + 14α− 23α2 − 16α(1− α)q1
q1 + q2 S 1.
The comparison of the slopes shows that firm 1’s reaction function is less
steeper for q1 + q2 < 1. For symmetric locations, that is q1 + q2 = 1, firms’
reaction functions exhibit the same slope. If q1 + q2 > 1 firm 1’s reaction
function is steeper than firm 2’s reaction function.
Because the reaction functions are non-linear we need the second deriva-
tives to make further conclusions about their behavior:
∂q21(q2)
∂2q2
=16α(1− α)2ϕ−3/21 ≥ 0,
∂q22(q1)
∂2q1
=− 16α(1− α)2ϕ−3/22 ≤ 0.
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Therefore, firm 1’s reaction function is strictly convex in q2. Firm 2’s reaction
function is strictly concave in q1.
Next, we evaluate the functions’ values at the endpoints of the strategy
space.
q1(q2 = 0) =
(
3(1− α)−
√
9− 2α− 7α2
)
/(4α) ≤ 0,
q1(q2 = 1) =
(
3 + α−
√
9 + 14α− 23α2
)
/(4α) ≤ 1,
q2(q1 = 0) =
(
−3(1− α) +
√
9 + 14α− 23α2
)
/(4α) ≥ 0,
q2(q1 = 1) =
(
7α− 3 +
√
9− 2α− 7α2
)
/(4α) ≥ 1.
Finally, we compare q2(q1(q2 = 1)) with 1 and q1(q2(q1 = 0)) with 0. Firm
2’s reaction function evaluated at q1(q2 = 1) is:
q2(q1(q2 = 1)) =
[
4α−
√
(23α + 9)(1− α)
+
√
(1− α)(19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α))
]
/(4α).
The comparison shows that q2(q1(q2 = 1)) S 1 dependent on α:
[
4α−
√
(23α + 9)(1− α) +
√
(1− α)(19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α))
]
/(4α) S 1
√
(1− α)(19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α)) S
√
(23α + 9)(1− α)
19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α) S 23α + 9
√
(23α + 9)(1− α) S α + 3
α(1− 3α) S 0.
For α < 1/3 firm 2’s reaction function yields a value greater than 1 evaluated
at (q1(q2 = 1)). If α = 1/3 and (q1(q2 = 1)) firm 2’s optimal location is 1.
For α > 1/3 firm 2’s reaction function takes a value less than 1 evaluated at
(q1(q2 = 1)).
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Similarly, q1(q2(q1 = 0)) S 0:
(
√
(23α + 9)(1− α)−
√
(1− α)(19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α)))/(4α) S 0
√
(23α + 9)(1− α) S
√
(1− α)(19α− 3 + 4
√
(23α + 9)(1− α))
0 S α(1− 3α).
For α < 1/3 firm 1’s optimal location is smaller than 0 evaluated at q2(q1 =
0). For α = 1/3 firm 1’s reaction function takes the value 0. If α > 1/3 and
q2(q1 = 0) firm 1’s optimal location is q1 > 0.
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